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Settling South Prairie: Section 301
Jurisdiction Over Representational Issues
The labor strife of the early twentieth century necessitated congres-

sional intervention if the benefits of an industrialized society were
to be fully realized. Congress sought to exert federal control over
labor relations' with the enactment of the National Labor Relations

Act 2 (hereinafter the Wagner Act) in 1935. The Wagner Act legitimized
collective bargaining and recognized the validity of collective bargaining

agreements. 3 The National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) was created
to administer the Wagner Act provisions .4
The NLRB processes, however, were viewed as inadequate by
Congress. 5 Twelve years after initial passage, Congress amended the
6
Wagner Act by enacting the Labor Management Relations Act,

(hereinafter the Taft-Hartley Act). Section 301 of the Taft-Hartley
Act gives federal courts original jurisdiction over violations of collective bargaining agreements. 8 The provision for NLRB jurisdiction over
representational issues9 by the Wagner Act and the original jurisdic-

tion given the courts under section 301 of the Taft-Hartley Act10 created

situations of conflicting jurisdiction. This author will explore the situa-

tions in which a breach of contract suit pursuant to section 301 presents
the court with representational issues. In particular, section 301 suits

alleging the single employer doctrine,1 ' a unit accretion12 or a stipulated
unit' 3 require the court initially to decide representational issues."

C. BuFFoa, BuFroRD ON THE WAGNER ACT §11, at 31 (1941).
Pub. L. No. 74-198, 49 Stat. 449, codified in 29 U.S.C. §§151-190 (as amended) (1982).
C. Bufford, supra note 1, §3, at 5-7.
Id. §§217-19, at 590-91.
See S. REP. No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 15, reprinted in I NLRB, LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY OF THE LABOR MANAGEMENT RELATIONS ACT, 1947, at 421 (1948).
6. Pub. L. No. 80-101, 61 Stat. 136, codified in 29 U.S.C. §§151-191 (as amended) (1982).
7. 29 U.S.C. §185(a) (1982).
8. Id. Contract actions between private parties otherwise would have to meet the requirements of $10,000 in controversy and diversity of citizenship. See 28 U.S.C. §1332.
9. Representational issues include the determination of the group of employees that will
comprise the bargaining unit. 29 U.S.C. §159(b). Moreover, when an established bargaining
unit seeks to include additional job classifications within the bargaining unit, the accretion
to the bargaining unit must be appropriate. Boire v. Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 479 F.2d 778,
796-97 (5th Cir. 1973).
10. See infra notes 66-101 and accompanying text.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id.
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
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The United States Supreme Court has denied the federal courts
jurisdiction to make initial determinations of representation issues if
these issues are presented on appeal from an NLRB determination."5
The Supreme Court, however, has not directly addressed the power
of federal courts to make these determinations pursuant to section
301 jurisdiction. 6 The circuit courts of appeal have addressed the issue
and are in conflict. 7
The purpose of this comment is to establish that federal courts may
determine representational issues when these issues arise pursuant to
section 301 jurisdiction. Therefore, the conflicting decisions of the
circuit courts of appeal will be analyzed. This analysis will reveal that
the source of disagreement is focused upon whether section 9 of the
Wagner Act, which allocates the determination of representational
issues to the NLRB, makes the jurisdiction of the NLRB exclusive.' 8
This author concludes the jurisdiction of the NLRB is not exclusive
and federal courts may make initial determinations of representational
issues pursuant to section 301 jurisdiction.
To support this result, this author will explore the rationale that
presently allows arbitrators to make bargaining unit determinations.
Courts and arbitrators will be compared in order to determine if the
distinctions drawn between the jurisdiction of the two is justified.
The application of the doctrine of traditional primary jurisdiction to
the initial determination of representation also will be explored. Particularly, section 301 jurisdiction will be analyzed in light of the objectives
of primary jurisdiction: uniformity of result and expertise." Finally,
this author will examine the practical result of bifurcating a section
301 suit between the NLRB and the courts. A bifurcated process causes
delays without a demonstrable effect on expertise or uniformity of
result. To understand more fully the existing conflict, one must first
understand the legislative history of section 301 jursidiction.
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF SECTION

301

Pursuant to the power to regulate commerce, Congress passed the
Wagner Act in 1935.10 The fundamental purpose of the Wagner Act
was to remove obstructions to the free flow of commerce by pro15. South Prairie Constr. Co. v. Local 627 Int'l Union of Operating Eng'rs, 425 U.S.
800, 803-04 (1976).
16. See infra notes 102-11 and accompanying text.
17. See infra notes 112-53 and accompanying text.
18. See infra notes 209-12 and accompanying text.
19. See United States v. W. Pac. R.R. Co., 352 U.S. 59, 64 (1956).
20. See R. CORTNER, THE VAGNER ACT CASES 82 (1964).
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moting industrial peace. 2' Principally, the Wagner Act gave legal
recognition to collective bargaining agreements2 2 and created the NLRB

to enforce the provisions of the Wagner Act.23
Congress intended the NLRB to be the primary tribunal to interpret
and administer the Wagner Act.2 4 This broad grant of authority gave

the NLRB jurisdiction over two aspects of the collective bargaining
process: unfair labor practices 2 and representation issues. 26 The grant

of jurisdiction over unfair labor practices is contained in sections 7
and 8 of the Wagner Act.2 7 Representation issues are reserved to the

NLRB in section 9 of the Wagner Act.28 Jurisdiction over representational issues includes the power to determine the unit of employees
appropriate for bargaining purposes.29 The NLRB also supervises the
elections by which the members of an appropriate unit choose their
bargaining representative.3"

This grant of jurisdiction reflected the intent of Congress that the
NLRB was best suited to administer the complex Wagner Act. 3'

Through the Wagner Act, Congress sought to establish a national
labor law paramount in the area of labor relations. 32 The purpose
of having a single agency administer the law was to prevent the confu33
sion likely to result if authority under the Wagner Act were diffused.

Centralized administration of a national labor law would result in
uniform application of the policies of the Wagner Act. 34 For this
reason, Congress confided development and application of this law
in an expert administrative body. The NLRB, however, was viewed
less favorably by employers.3 6
21.
22.
23.
24.

C. BuFFORD, supra note 1, §3, at 5.
See id.
See id.§215, at 589.
See Garner v. Teamsters Local No. 776, 346 U.S. 485, 489-90 (1953).

25.

National Labor Relations Act §8, codified in 29 U.S.C. §158.

26. National Labor Relations Act §9, codified in 29 U.S.C. §159.
27. Section 7 of the Wagner Act specifies the rights of employees, such as the right to
organize, choose representatives, and bargain collectively. 29 U.S.C. §157. Section 8 of the
Wagner Act provides that infringement of the rights contained in section 7 constitutes an unfair
labor practice. 29 U.S.C. §158(a)(1). Other activities constituting an unfair labor practice include:
interfering with the operation of a labor organization, coercive membership practices, refusing
to bargain, and hot cargo agreements. 29 U.S.C. §158(a)-(e).
28. 29 U.S.C. §159.
29. Id.§159(b).
30. Id. §159(c).
31. See Garner v. Teamsters Local No. 776, 346 U.S. 485, 489-90.
32. See Amalgamated Util. Workers v. Consol. Edison Co. of New York, Inc., 309 U.S.
261, 267-70 (1939).
33. Id.
34. See Garner v. Teamsters Local No. 776, 346 U.S. 485, 490 (1953).
35. See 4 K. DAvis, ADI inSsTRAnvE LAW TREATISE §22:5, at 100 (2d ed. 1983).
36.

See C. BuFFo.D, supra note 1, at 10.
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Industrial employers viewed the NLRB as prejudiced in favor of
labor interests." Additionally, employers experienced dissatisfaction
with having to resort to the prolonged process of obtaining relief
through the NLRB.1s Employers, however, had little recourse in dealing
with unions other than through the NLRB because of procedural and
practical limitations on the use of state court proceedings."
The concerns of employers were persuasive and in 1947 Congress
responded by enacting the Taft-Hartley Act.40 This Act amended the
Wagner Act"' giving federal courts original jurisdiction over violations of collective bargaining agreements.4 1 Section 301 of the TaftHartley Act provides for the enforcement of labor contracts in any
federal court having jurisdiction over the parties, regardless of diversity of citizenship or amount in controversy. 3 Parties to a collective
bargaining agreement, therefore, could sue for breach of contract in
federal court. Section 301 of the Taft- Hartley Act reflected the Con-

gressional belief that the processes of the NLRB were inadequate to
deal with union misconduct." Thus, the enforcement of collective
bargaining agreements was intended to be left to the usual processes
of law, not to the NLRB.4 5
The statutory grant of federal court jurisdiction under section 301

has been held constitutional.4 '6 Furthermore, the substantive law to
be applied in section 301 suits is federal law. 7 This substantive law
is to be fashioned from the policy of national labor laws, 4 leading

37.

See H.R. REP. No. 245, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 6, reprinted in I NLRB,

HISTORY OF THE LABOR MANAGEMENT RELATIONS ACT,

LEGISLATIVE

1947, at 297 (1948). The NLRB, as con-

stituted under the Wagner Act, allegedly condoned unfair labor practices and coercive membership methods on the part of unions. Id.
38.
See S. REP. No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 15, reprinted in 1 NLRB, LEOISLATIVE
HISTORY OF THE LABOR MANAGEMENT RELATIONS ACT,

1947, at 421-24 (1948).

39. Many states do not permit unincorporated associations to be sued as an entity. See
S. REP. No. 105, 80th Cong., Ist Sess. 15, reprinted in I NLRB, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY O
THE LABOR MANAGEMENT RELATIONS ACT, 1947, at 421-24 (1948).

40.

See I NLRB,

LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE LABOR MANAGEMENT RELATIONS ACT,

1947,

LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE LABOR MANAGEMENT RELATIONS ACT,

1947,

at 507-08 (1948).

41.

1 NLRB,

at 1 (1948).
42. Labor Management Relations Act 301, codified in 29 U.S.C. §185(a).
43. Id.
44. See S. REP. No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 15, reprinted in 1 NLRB, LEGISLATiVE
HISTORY OF THE LABOR MANAGEMENT RELATIONS ACT, 1947, at 421-24 (1948).
45. See H. CoNF. REPORT No. 510, 80th Cong., Ist Sess. 42, reprintedin 1947 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEws 1147,
RELATIONS ACT, 1947, at

46.
47.
48.
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and in I NLRB,
546 (1948).

LEGIsLATrVE HISTORY OF THE LABOR MANAGEMENT

See Textile Workers Union of Am. v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 452-53 (1957).
Id.
Id.
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to the development of a body of substantive federal law based upon
the policies of the national labor laws. 9
The federal common law is the Taft-Hartley Act as interpreted and
applied by the courts in section 301 suits.5" The Taft-Hartley Act
retained section 9 of the Wagner Act relating to employee representation."' Thus, in a section 301 suit the federal courts can be called
upon to apply and interpret the law relating to representational issues."
REPRESENTATIONAL ISSUES
The appropriate bargaining unit determination is delegated to the
NLRB.5 3 Although the determination is a factual finding,14 an element
of agency discretion exists." The NLRB need only designate an appro56
priate unit, not necessarily the most appropriate unit.
In determining an appropriate bargaining unit, the NLRB designates
a group of employees sharing a community of interest. 5" The group
thus constituted will select a bargaining representative.5 8 Large bargaining units are difficult for unions to organize and increase the degree
of discord. Small units, however, are disfavored by employers because
of their cohesiveness. 60 In addition, the fragmentation of the employees
into small bargaining units creates difficulties for the employer in dealing with his work force as a whole. 6' Therefore, this determination
of the scope of the bargaining unit has great impact upon the collective
bargaining process. 6 2
If the bargaining unit composition is challenged, the NLRB will
undertake a unit clarification. 63 This decision is conclusive on the
49. See Dowd Box Co. v. Courtney, 368 U.S. 502, 506-08 (1962); Teamsters Union Local
No. 174 v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95, 103 (1962).
50. See Textile Workers Union of Am. v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 456-57 (1957).
51. 29 U.S.C. §159.
52. See infra notes 66-102 and accompanying text.
53. See West Point-Pepperell, Inc. v. Textile Workers Union of Am., 559 F.2d 304, 307
(5th Cir. 1977).
54. Id.
55. See Boire, 479 F.2d at 797.
56. R. GoRiAN, BASIC TExT ON LABOR LAw 66 (1976).

57. Id. at 69. The relevant factors considered by the NLRB are similarity in earnings,

hours, kind of work performed, and qualifications. Id. Also considered are degree of interchange among employees, geographic proximity, common supervision and determination of labor
relations policy, history of collective bargaining, desires of affected employees, and the extent
of union organization. Id.
58. 29 U.S.C. §159(a).
59. See R. GoitAN, BAsIc TEXT ON LABOR LAW 67-68 (1976).
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 68.
63. See 18 T. KHEEL, Busmss ORGANIZATIONS §14.01, at 14-15 (1984).
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parties." Pursuant to section 301 jurisdiction, however, bargaining
unit determinations have been presented to the federal courts as well 5
CONFLICTING JUIUSDICTION

Issues of representation may be the subject of section 301 breach
of contract actions in two different settings: (1) suits based on the
single employer doctrine; 66 or (2) labor contracts in which the bargaining unit is defined as a term of the contract, such as stipulated units
or contracts containing an accretion clause.6 ' The single employer doctrine is an NLRB construct by which two or more related enterprises
are recognized as a single entity.6 8 The single employer doctrine is
employed to meet the jurisdictional minimum of the NLRB 69 or to
treat two or more enterprises the same for the purposes of an unfair
labor practice or representational proceeding before the NLRB. 0 In
determining whether the companies should be treated as a single
employer, the NLRB considers the interrelation of operations as well
as common management and control. 7' Once a finding of single
employer is reached, the NLRB must inquire whether the two or more
groups of employees constitute an appropriate bargaining unit based
upon a community of interest among the employees.7 1 If the NLRB
concludes that two or more companies are in fact a single employer
and the groups of employees constitute an appropriate bargaining unit,
the NLRB then will treat the companies as one for the purposes of
the NLRB.7 3
Section 301 suits based upon the single employer doctrine are supported by the Supreme Court " and the legislative intent of section
301 of Taft-Hartley." The doctrine is employed to bind nonsignatory
companies to the labor agreement.7 6 Like the NLRB, the federal court
77
must determine whether the two enterprises are a single employer.
Unlike the bargaining unit determination, the single employer deter64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
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Id.
See infra notes 66-102 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 68-83 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 84-91 and accompanying text.
See Carpenters Local No. 1846 v. Pratt-Farnsworth, 690 F.2d 489, 504 (5th Cir. 1982).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 505.
Id.
See id. at 511.
Id.
Id. at 503.
Id. at 510.
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mination is not reserved to the NLRB by the Wagner Act.78 If the
court concludes the two or more related enterprises are in fact a single
employer for bargaining purposes, the court then proceeds to the second prong of the single employer doctrine." 9 Similar to the NLRB,
the court must determine that the employees of the related employers
constitute an appropriate bargaining unit. 0 Only then are all parties,
including the nonsignatory employer, bound by the collective bargaining
agreement. 8 ' A section 301 suit based upon the single employer doctrine, therefore, requires the federal court to determine the appropriateness of the bargaining unit, a representational issue reserved
to the NLRB.' "
Representational issues also arise in cases in which the parties included the scope of the bargaining unit as a term of the contract."
The first type of contractual unit designation is a labor contract that
contains an accretion clause. " An accretion clause provides that the
labor contract will be extended to include employees not currently
part of the bargaining unit if certain agreed events occur." The contract may provide that employees at subsequently acquired worksites
will accrete to the existing unit.16 Moreover, a change in the duties
of employees also may call for a similar accretion. 87
If the union alleges that an accretion to the bargaining unit has
occurred either by reason of acquired worksites or a change in
employee duties, the NLRB determines whether the employees sought
to be included are a proper accretion to the bargaining unit. 8 Bargaining unit accretions, however, have been approached with hesitance
by the NLRB.' 9 The rationale offered for the reluctance of the NLRB
to enforce accretion clauses is that the accretion of employees to a
bargaining unit, which is not chosen by the employee, violates the
right of the accreted employees under section 7 of the Wagner Act
to bargain collectively through a representative of their own choosing.90
78.

See Bhd. of Teamsters Local No. 70 v. California Consolidators, Inc., 693 F.2d 81,

83 (9th Cir. 1982).
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 83-84.
83. See Pratt-Farnsworth,690 F.2d at 524 n.17.
84. See, e.g., Boire, 479 F.2d at 782; Local No. 3-193 Int'l Woodworkers of Am. v.
Ketchikan Pulp Co., 611 F.2d 1295, 1296-97 (9th Cir. 1982).
85. See Pratt-Farnsworth,690 F.2d at 524 n.17.
86. See, e.g., Boire, 479 F.2d at 782; Ketchikan, 611 F.2d at 1296-97.
87. See, e.g., Local No. 204 Int'l Bhd. of Elec. Workers v. Iowa Electric, 668 F.2d 413,
414-15 (8th Cir. 1982); Carey v. Westinghouse Corp., 375 U.S. 261, 262-63 (1964).
88. See Boire, 479 F.2d at 796-97.
89. Id. at 795-96.
90. Id. at 796-97.
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Courts also are reluctant to enforce contract accretion clauses. 9 '
The courts share the concern of the NLRB regarding the right of
employees to choose their bargaining representative.9 2 This right of
self-determination comes into focus in the unit accretion situation
because a determination of both unit composition and unit representation is required.93 In these situations, courts readily defer to the procedures of the NLRB for determining unit accretions. 94
Stipulated units, on the other hand, require a more limited analysis
by the NLRB or courts. Stipulated units may result from an agreement
between the employer and the union regarding the scope of a bargaining unit prior to the actual collective bargaining.9 5 Alternatively, the
unit may be stipulated by a term of the contract. 96 The sole inquiry
is whether the unit, as comprised, is repugnant to the Wagner Act
or its policies.9 7 Stipulated units, therefore, do not require either the
NLRB or the courts to determine the appropriateness of the bargaining unit. 98
Thus, section 301 actions alleging the single employer doctrine or
seeking to enforce an accretion clause require the court to make a
bargaining unit determination. 99 Bargaining unit determinations,
however, are reserved to the NLRB by section 9 of the Wagner Act.'
Whether courts may make these determinations has not been addressed
definitively by the Supreme Court.
FEDERAL COURT JURISDICTION
The Supreme Court has addressed the jurisdiction of representational
issues only in the context of judicial review of agency action.' 0 ' In
South Prairie Construction Company v. Local No. 627 International
02
Union of Operating Engineers,1
the union filed an unfair labor practices complaint with the NLRB alleging two construction companies
were in fact a single employer. 103 The NLRB rejected the contention
91.

See id. at 796-97; see also Ketchikan, 611 F.2d at 1301; Pratt-Farnsworth,690 F.2d

at 519-20.
92.
93.
94.

See Pratt-Farnsworth,690 F.2d at 521.
See Boire, 479 F.2d at 796-97 (quoting Pix Maintenance Co., 181 N.L.R.B. 88 (1970)).
See Pratt-Farnsworth, 690 F.2d at 524 n.17.
95. R. Go AN, BAsIc TEXT ON LABOR LAw 66 (1976).
96. See Pratt-Farnsworth,690 F.2d at 503 n.6.
97. See SCM Corp. v. Local No. 527 Printing & Graphic Communications Union, 116
L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1158 (1984).
98. See Pratt-Farnsworth, 690 F.2d at 524 n.17.
99. See supra notes 74-82 and accompanying text.
100. See 29 U.S.C. §159(b).
101. See Pratt-Farnsworth,690 F.2d at 515-17.
102. 425 U.S. 800 (1976).
103. See South Prairie,425 U.S. at 801.
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of the union without reaching the appropriate bargaining unit issue.10°
When the union appealed the decision of the NLRB, the Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia reversed the finding of the
NLRB.'0 5 The District of Columbia Circuit found the two companies
were a single employer, satisfying the first prong of the single employer
doctrine.' 6 The court proceeded to determine the second prong of
the single employer doctrine, the existence of an appropriate bargaining
unit comprised of the two groups of employees.' 0 7 Although the single
employer issue was reviewable, the Supreme Court reversed, holding
the NLRB had never reached the issue of the appropriateness of the
bargaining unit.' 0 8 The Court reasoned that the initial determination
by the court of appeals of the bargaining unit question was "incompatible with the orderly function of the process of judicial review" and
remanded to the NLRB for further findings.' 9 Whether the "incompatible test" addresses section 301 jurisdiction as well as appellate
review is a source of conflict." ' Subsequent decisions of the courts
of appeal have adopted different approaches to this question.
In 1980, the Ninth Circuit concluded that both the reach of South
Prairieand the Congressional intent of section 9 of the Wagner Act
precluded section 301 jurisdiction over representational issues."' In
Local No. 3-193 International Woodworkers of America v. Ketchikan
Pulp Co.," 2 the union and the employer entered into a collective
bargaining contract providing that employees at future worksites would
accrete to the existing bargaining unit." 3 The employer acquired additional worksites and refused to recognize an accretion to the existing
bargaining unit."' The union brought suit seeking interpretation and
enforcement of the contract and the action was removed to federal
court pursuant to section 301.115 The Ninth Circuit denied the demand
for accretion, recognizing that the two areas reserved to the NLRB,
unfair labor practices and representational issues, represented different
policy considerations."16 Although the court could take jurisdiction

104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.

Id. at 801-02.
Id.at 802.

116.

Id.at 1298.

Id.

Id.at 803.
Id. at 803-04.
Id. at 805 (quoting N.L.R.B. v. Metropolitan Ins. Co., 380 U.S. 438, 444 (1965)).
See infra notes 110-47 and accompanying text.
Ketchikan, 611 F.2d at 1298-99.
611 F.2d 1295 (9th Cir. 1980).
Id. at 1296-97.
Id.at 1297.
Id. at 1296-97.
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of a contract violation action concerning an unfair labor practice,
representational issues embodied a special concern for employee selfdetermination of bargaining representatives." 7 This strong policy of
self-determination could not be circumvented under the guise of contract interpretation.""
The result in Ketchikan can be attributed to the unfavorable attitude the courts and the NLRB have shown toward unit accretions."I9
The accretion determination reaches beyond the appropriateness of
the bargaining unit to the actual designation of a bargaining
representative.' 20 The Ninth Circuit, however, also has refused to permit
section 301 jurisdiction if only the unit appropriateness issue is
presented.' 2 ' In a single employer case, for example, the court relied
heavily upon the reasoning in Ketchikan to conclude that the Congressional intent in section 9 and the holding in South Prairiereserved
the unit appropriateness issue exclusively to the NLRB. 22 Thus, the
Ninth Circuit does not recognize federal court jurisdiction in section
301 suits involving representational issues.
A subsequent decision by the Eighth Circuit applied a different
analysis. In Local Union 204, InternationalBrotherhood of Electrical
Workers v. Iowa Electric Light and Power Co.,23 the union successfully petitioned the NLRB for the accretion of quality control inspectors
to the bargaining unit.' 24 The union proposed contract modifications
based upon the accretion.' 25 The employer rejected the modifications
and the unit accretion.' 26 The union then notified the employer that
the contract modifications were deemed accepted and subsequently
27
filed a section 301 suit.'
The Eighth Circuit recognized the conflict between section 301 jurisdiction of the courts over contract violations and -the jurisdiction of
the NLRB over representational issues.' 21 Between these grants of
authority, the court held the dividing line to be whether the issue
was primarily contractual or primarily representational. 29 The court
117.
118.
119.
120.

Id. at 1298-99.
Id. at 1299-1300.
See Pratt-Farnsworth, 690 F.2d at 520.
See supra notes 113-16 and accompanying text.

121.

California Consolidators, 693 F.2d at 83-84.

122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.

Id. at 82-83.
668 F.2d 413 (8th Cir. 1982).
Iowa Electric, 668 F.2d at 415.
Id.
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in Iowa Electric observed that the dispute centered upon the unit accretion issue and concluded the dispute primarily was representational. 3 ' Although the Eighth Circuit did not conclude whether the
jurisdiction of the NLRB was exclusive or primary,' 3' representational
issues were held to be outside the scope of section 301 jurisdiction.' 3 2
The Fifth Circuit took a different approach from either the Eighth
or Ninth Circuits and reached a result contrary to both. In Carpenters
Local Union No. 1846 v. Pratt-Farnsworth,33 the court concluded
that in certain circumstances a federal court could take jurisdiction
of a representation issue.' Pratt-Farnsworthwas a section 301 breach
of contract case in which the plaintiff alleged that two related construction companies, one union and the other non-union, were in fact a
single employer. 35 Neither the employer nor the union previously had
36
invoked the jurisdiction of the NLRB by seeking a unit clarification.
The Pratt-Farnsworthcourt refused to construe South Prairie as
vesting the NLRB with exclusive jurisdiction over representational
issues.' 37 Rather, the court limited the application of South Prairie
to situations concerning judicial review of NLRB determinations, not
section 301 original jurisdiction.' 38 The court concluded, therefore,
that South Prairiewas not a bar to initial determination of appropriate
39
bargaining unit by a federal court in a section 301 action.'
This distinction between initial determinations and issues presented
on appellate review was the focus of an alternative basis for the
holding. Pratt-Farnsworthalso held that the same absence of prior
NLRB involvement made the Wagner Act inapplicable.' 0 The court
gave a restrictive reading to the language of section 9 which sets forth
the jurisdiction of the NLRB over representation issues.'' The portion
of section 9 providing for NLRB determination of the appropriate
bargaining unit "in each case"'4 2 was read to mean in each case in
which the parties had invoked the processes of the NLRB. 4 3 In Pratt-

130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.

Id. at 419-20.
Id. at 420.
Id. at 420-21.
690 F.2d 489 (5th Cir. 1982).
Pratt-Farnsworth, 690 F.2d at 515-17.
Id. at 498-99.

136. Id.at 515.
137. Id.at 514.
138. Id.
139. Id.

140. Id.at 514-15.
141. Id.at 515.
142. Id.at 514-15 (quoting 29 U.S.C. §159(b)).
143. Id.
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Farnsworth,no party had resorted to the NLRB;I'" thus, neither section
9 of the Wagner Act nor South Prairie supported the proposition
that the authority of the NLRB was exclusive. 4 ' The jurisdiction of
the NLRB was not exclusive'"6 and the enforcement of the contract
necessarily required a determination of who is bound by the contract. 47
Therefore, the Fifth Circuit held that federal courts have jurisdiction
of the representational issue when necessary to determine the underlying
claim for breach of contract.""
Although the Supreme Court has not addressed the issue, the reasoning of the Fifth Circuit makes sense.'" 9 A reading of the exact language
used in South Prairiesupports the distinction made by the court in
Pratt-Farnsworthbetween cases presenting initial determination issues
and issues presented subsequent to NLRB involvement.' South Prairie
focused on the role of federal courts in reviewing prior administrative
determinations, holding that the judicial role in this setting is limited. "'
If confimed to the issue of judicial review, the case has limited relevance
to initial judicial determination of representational issues." 2 The
Supreme Court, however, has allowed arbitrators to determine representational issues.' 3 Since allowing arbitrators to make bargaining unit
determinations is inconsistent with denying federal courts the same
power,' 54 this author next will explore the rationale behind arbitration of representational issues.
ARBITRATION OF REPRESENTATIONAL ISSUES

The Supreme Court has addressed the role of arbitrators in representation disputes.' 55 Since most labor contracts require disputes arising
out of the contract to be submitted to an arbitrator, 6 the role of
labor arbitration has been significant. Thus, the allocation of power
between the NLRB and arbitrators is relevant.
An analysis of the allocation of power between the NLRB and arbi144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.

Id. at 515.
Id. at 514-15.
Id. at 514.
Id.
Id. at 517.
See supra notes 132-47 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 136-38 and accompanying text.
South Prairie, 425 U.S. at 805-06.
Pratt-Farnsworth,690 F.2d at 514-15.

153.

See infra note 191-203 and accompanying text.

154.
155.

See infra notes 225-31 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 168-86 and accompanying text.

156.
(1983).
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trators requires a discussion of what constitutes arbitration. Arbitration
is a dispute resolution mechanism that the parties have provided for
in their contract. 5 7 An arbitration clause provides for the submission
of disputes to a third party for resolution.' 58 The authority of the
arbitrator is derived from the contract. 59 The decision of the arbitrator,
therefore, is contractually binding upon the parties. 60 The significant
difference between arbitrators and courts or the NLRB is that the
arbitrator does not possess any power independent of that allocated
by the parties in the terms of the contract.' 6 ' The scope of the arbitrator's power is limited to issues arising under the contract and may
be circumscribed further by terms limiting the type of disputes that
may be arbitrated. 62
Arbitrators also lack the authority to enforce their awards.' 63 If
an arbitrator has exceeded the contractual authority, the courts will
refuse to enforce the award.' Furthermore, although arbitrators usually do not determine their own jurisdiction,' 6 5 they have not considered
the jurisdiction of the NLRB to be a bar to their jurisdiction. 66
In Carey v. Westinghouse Corporation,6 7 the Supreme Court held
that the jurisdiction of the NLRB over representational issues was
not a bar to the arbitration of representation issues. 8 Carey presented
a dispute arising out of a collective bargaining agreement. 6 9 The union
and the employer agreed to the use of arbitration in the event of
unresolved disputes involving the "interpretation, application or claimed
violation"' 70 of the agreement. The union was the exclusive bargaining
representative for all production and maintenance employees,' 7 ' but
salaried and technical employees were represented by a different

157. See P. HAYS, supra note 156, at 13.
158. Id.
159. TROTTA, ARBITRATION OF LABOR-MANAGEMENT DISPUTES 78 (1974).
160. F. ELKoURI, HoW ARBITRATION WoRKs 3 (1952). Arbitration is to be distinguished
from mediation which is not binding on the parties. Id. A mediator, rather, seeks to persuade
parties to reach agreement, but cannot compel them to do so. Id.
161. See TRoTTA, supra note 159 at 23-24.
162. See id. at 81.
163. See United Steelworkers of Am. v. Warrior and Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574,
581 (1960).
164. See United Steelworkers of Am. v. Enter. Wheel and Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 597
(1960).
165. 0. FAiRWEATHR, PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE IN LABOR ARBITRATION 213-15 (1983).
166. Id. at 129.
167. Carey v. Westinghouse Corp., 375 U.S. 261 (1964).
168. Id.
169. Id. at 262.
170. Id.
171. Id.
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bargaining unit.' 2 The union alleged that the employer was using
technical employees to perform production and maintenance duties'
and characterized the dispute as a work assignment, not a representational, issue. 74 When the union filed a grievance, the employer refused
issue,
to arbitrate, alleging that the dispute concerned a representational
75
NLRB.'
the
of
jurisdiction
exclusive
the
within
The conflicting characterizations of the dispute were not determinative of the issue.' 76 The Supreme Court, instead of deciding whether
the dispute was a representational or work assignment issue, took a
broader stance and held, regardless of the nature of the dispute, that
the pervasive, curative effect of arbitration' 7 was likely to serve the
interests of industrial peace.' 78 The Court, however, did provide limitations on the power of arbitrators to decide representational issues.
The decision of the arbitrator must be fair and not repugnant to the
purposes of the Wagner Act.' 7 9 Additionally, a subsequent determination by the NLRB takes precedence over the arbitrator's decision. 1 0
The possibility of conflict between the earlier decision of the arbitrator
and a later NLRB determination was held to be outweighed by the
benefits of arbitration at an early stage of the conflict."'
In addition, the Court included some controversial dicta. The power
of arbitrators, regardless of the nature of the dispute, was justified
by analogizing to the jurisdiction of the courts."' The Court in Carey
noted that state and federal courts could determine unfair labor practices under section 301 jurisdiction."' In considering section 301 jurisdiction, the Court did not distinguish between unfair labor practices
and representational issues."' The Court concluded, therefore, that
state and federal courts had jurisdiction over representational issues.'
The dicta has not been persuasive on the issue. " Courts have noted
a difference between unfair labor practices and representational
issues." 1 A stronger case for deferral to the NLRB has been recognized
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.
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in the latter instance. 88 Additionally, South Prairiewas decided after
Carey and the holding in South Prairiewas perceived as a rejection
by the Supreme Court of the earlier dicta. 89 Notwithstanding the decision in South Prairie, however, the power of arbitrators to make
bargaining unit determinations has been upheld.' 90
If the dispute is between the NLRB and arbitrators over representational issues, courts have upheld the power of arbitrators.', Jurisdictional disputes between the NLRB and section 301 court jurisdiction
over representational issues, however, result in a preference for NLRB
jurisdiction.' 2 Two rationales have been cited in support of the preference for arbritration over NLRB processes. First, the disputes concern a contract providing arbitration as a mechanism for the resolution
of these disputes; therefore, later action by the NLRB may be unnecessary because of the "pervasive curative effect"' 93 of arbitration. Second, section 203(d)"' of the Taft-Hartley Act provides that a method
agreed upon by the parties will be the desirable method of resolving
grievances.'19
Although the Ninth Circuit has noted the apparent inconsistent treatment by the courts of arbitrators and section 301 jurisdiction,'9 6 the
Supreme Court has never directly addressed the issue. Circuit courts,
however, have held the inroads of arbitration into the allegedly exclusive jurisdiction of the NLRB over representational issues do not expand the section 301 jurisdiction of the courts. 97 Courts have distinguished between issues concerning unfair labor practices and representational issues' s as well as between adjudication of these issues by
arbitrators and federal courts. 99
Some analogies, however, may be drawn between section 301 suits
and arbitration. First, in the absence of an arbitration clause, section
301 jurisdiction is an available alternative for bargaining unit issues
arising out of a collective bargaining agreement. Taft-Hartley expressly
188. Id.
189. Id.

190. See Retail Clerks Local No. 588, Retail Clerks Int'l Ass'n v. NLRB, 565 F.2d 769,
778 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
191. See, e.g., Retail Clerks, 565 F.2d at 778; Carey, 375 U.S. at 272.
192. See, e.g., California Consolidators, 693 F.2d at 83-84; Ketchikan, 611 F.2d at 1299-1300;
West Point Pepperell, 559 F.2d at 306-07.
193. See Retail Clerks, 565 F.2d at 777; see also Carey, 375 U.S. at 272.
194. 29 U.S.C. §173(d).
195. Carey, 375 U.S. at 264-65.
196. See Carpenters Local No. 1478 v. Stevens, reported in 117 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2023,
2027 (9th Cir. 1984).
197. Id. at 2027.
198. See supra note 117 and accompanying text.
199. See Ketchikan, 611 F.2d at 1298.
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provides that the enforcement of contracts is to be left to the usual
processes of law, not to the NLRB. °0 Moreover, the NLRB does not
have the power to interpret a contract. 20 Thus, in the absence of
22
an arbitration clause section 301 jurisdiction would be appropriate.
Second, the dicta in Carey indicated that unfair labor practices and
representational issues are analogous when considering the jurisdiction
of the federal courts. 2 3 The courts can determine issues concerning
unfair labor practices even though a remedy is available before the
NLRB. .4 Similarly, the courts should be able to determine representational issues notwithstanding the ability of either party to petition
the NLRB for a unit clarification. 0 5
Section 301 jurisdiction, however, has not been shown the same
deference as arbitration. 0 6 One explanation offered is that arbitration is an exception to the exclusive jurisdiction of the NLRB. 217 The
courts, however, have not agreed on whether the jurisdiction of the
NLRB is exclusive. Courts have used vague terms that avoid the hard
question. These terms include the responsibility of the NLRB20 8 the
2 10
preeminence of the NLRB, °9 the primary competence of the NLRB
and primary, if not exclusive, jurisdiction. 1 Characterizing the jurisdiction of the NLRB as exclusive or primary produces different results
when considering the jurisdiction of the courts.
An assertion that the jurisdiction of the NLRB over representational issues is exclusive is difficult to support. Retail Clerks Local
588, Retail Clerks InternationalAssociation v. NLRB, 112 decided subsequent to South Prairie, upheld the authority of arbitrators to make
bargaining unit determinations. 2 3 If both arbitrators and the NLRB
may decide representational issues, the jurisdiction of the NLRB must

200. See H. CoMP. REPORT No. 510, IstSess. 42, reprintedin 1947 U.S. CODE CONO. AND
AD. NEws 1147, and in 1 NLRB,LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE LABOR MANAGEMENT RELATIONS
ACT, 1947, at 546 (1948).
201. See Sinclair Refining Co. v. NLRB, 306 F.2d 569, 576 (5th Cir. 1962).
202. See supra notes 197-98 and accompanying text.
203. Carey, 375 U.S. at 268.
204. Id.
205. See Pratt-Farnsworth,690 F.2d at 519.
206. See supra notes 192-93 and accompanying text.
207. See Comment, Arbitration of Representation Issues: A Critique of Carey, 1983 B.Y.U.
L. REv. 349, 367.
208. See Pratt-Farnsworth,690 F.2d at 514.
209. See Iowa Electric, 668 F.2d at 420.
210. Bhd. of Teamsters Local No. 70 v. California Consolidators, Inc., 693 F.2d 81, 82
(9th Cir. 1982).
211. See Ketchikan, 611 F.2d at 1298.
212. 565 F.2d 769 (D.C.Cir. 1977).
213. See Retail Clerks, 565 F.2d at 778.
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not be exclusive.2" 4 Additionally, in denying federal court jurisdiction
over representational issues, Ketchikan balked at describing the jurisdiction of the NLRB as exclusive.2" 5
The jurisdiction of the NLRB, therefore, cannot be described as
exclusive and remain consistent with the holding in Carey.2 6 The Fifth
and Ninth Circuits hinted that the NLRB may have primary jurisdiction
over representational issues.2" 7 Since the Fifth and Ninth Circuits prefer
to characterize the jurisdiction of the NLRB as primary, the doctrine
of traditional primary jurisdiction must be considered. 2' 8
APPLICATION OF THE PRIMARY JURISDICTION DOCTRINE

The doctrine of primary jurisdiction is a judicial creation2" ' under
which the court abstains from exercising jurisdiction until the administrative agency having special competence to deal with the -subject matter
has acted. 22 ° No fixed formula for the application of primary jurisdiction exists. 22 ' Rather, the doctrine requires the court to defer to the
particular adminstrative agency whenever the objectives of the doctrine,
expertise and uniformity of result, are implicated.22 2 The doctrine particularly is relevant to the initial determination of appropriate bargaining unit because the doctrine does not alter the authority of either
courts or administrative agencies; 223 rather, the doctrine guides a court
in determining "whether [a] court or agency will initially decide a
particular issue, not the question whether [a] court or agency will
' 224
finally decide the issue.
An initial examination would indicate that perhaps courts should
defer to the NLRB when a bargaining unit issue is presented. First,
the expertise of the NLRB regarding representation is presumed.2 25
Second, the federal courts may misconstrue and misapply the Wagner
Act.226 Conflicting decisions between the federal courts and the NLRB

214. Id.
215. See Ketchikan, 611 F.2d at 1298.
216. See supra note 165 and accompanying text.
217. See Pratt-Farnsworth,690 F.2d at 515 n.11.
218. See Ketchikan, 611 F.2d at 1298.
219. See Pratt-Farnsworth,690 F.2d at 515 n.11.
220. See United States v. W. Pac. R.R. Co., 352 U.S. 59, 64 (1956).
221. Id.
222. Id.
223. See Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Carpenters, 436 U.S. 180, 199 n.29 (1978) (quoting 3
K. DAvis, ADmINIsTRATIVE LAw TREATISE §19.01 at 3 (1958) (emphasis in original)).
224. Id.
225. R. GoniuAN, BAsic TEXT ON LBOaR LAw 67 (1976).
226. See Sovern, Section 301 and the Primary Jurisdictionof the NLRB, 76 HARv. L. REv.
529, 546 (1962).
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will be destructive to a comprehensive federal scheme; 22 therefore,
representational issues should be deferred to the NLRB.
A conclusion that the NLRB possesses expertise superior to the
courts, however, does not seem clearly established. The federal courts
are concerned intimately with the administration of the Wagner Act,
both statutorily through section 301228 jurisdiction and through judicial
review of NLRB decisions.229 While NLRB bargaining unit determinations are not directly reviewable, 230 representational issues do reach
the courts of appeal by procedures established for the review of unfair
labor practices.2 1' The foregoing analysis indicates that the alleged
disparity of 32expertise between the courts and the NLRB is
2
exaggerated.
The concern for lack of uniformity also is no bar to initial determination of representational issues by federal courts. Under section
301 jurisdiction, issues may reach the court only if the issues arise
from the rights of the parties under the labor contract.233 Since the
issues arise out of a contract peculiar to the parties, the determination
of the court is not likely to have broader implications for the regulatory
function of the NLRB. 34 Moreover, primary jurisdiction does not
allocate the ultimate authority to determine the issue.235 Rather, primary
jurisdiction is a tool for allocating the workload between courts and
administrative agencies. 236 Finally, the law applied in section 301 actions
is fashioned from the policies of national labor law. 237 Therefore,
because both the NLRB and the courts will be applying the same
law,238 the disparity in result will be minimized.
The concerns pertaining to uniformity and expertise aside, the parties
need not resort to the administrative agency if the remedy available
will be inadequate. 239 Although the NLRB can determine the bargaining
227.
228.
229.
230.
and the

See San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 245 (1959).
See supra notes 40-45 and accompanying text.
See Iowa Electric, 668 F.2d at 416 n.6.
Id. at 420. Judicial review is limited because of the presumed expertise of the NLRB
discretionary nature of an appropriate bargaining unit determination. R. GoniAN, BASIC

TEXT ON LABOR LAW 67 (1976).

231. See Ketchikan, 611 F.2d at 1299. Appeals from NLRB decisions constitute 15% of
the appellate workload and 30% of agency appeals. See L. MoDiaSKA, NLRB PRACTICE 89
n.5 (1983).
232. See supra notes 221-24 and accompanying text.
233. See supra notes 40-45 and accompanying text.
234. See World Airways, Inc., v. Northeast Airlines, Inc., 349 F.2d 1007, 1010-11 (1st Cir.
1965).
235. See supra notes 223-24 and accompanying text.
236. Id.
237. See Textile Workers Union of Am. v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 456-57 (1957).
238. Id.
239. See McCoy v. Greensboro City Bd. of Educ., 283 F.2d 667, 670 (4th Cir. 1960); United
States v. Zweifel, 508 F.2d 1150, 1156 n.6 (10th Cir. 1975).
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unit issue,24 the NLRB cannot enforce the contract.24 1 Therefore, the

parties would have to institute a section 301

suit.242

The delays inherent in a bifurcated action do not serve the purposes
of the Wagner Act. 24 3 The initial NLRB action is slow. 244 As one
court noted, "[t]he notoriously glacial immobility of the NLRB could
easily drag the unit clarification out for a year or more .... -241
When judicial process must follow the NLRB action, the delays are
246
extended.
During this prolonged process, the representation dispute will remain
unresolved. The issue of representation goes to the heart of the collective bargaining process 247 and the protection afforded by the Wagner
Act will be enhanced if the representational question receives prompt
determination.24 8 If the parties have not provided for arbitration,
prompt court action seems appropriate. Although the possibility of
conflict with the NLRB exists, the court is no more likely than the
NLRB to err.24 9 Furthermore, a judicial determination of representational issues, even if erroneous, is still subject to appellate review.
Thus, the policies of primary jurisdiction, uniformity of result and
agency expertise, are no bar to judicial determination of representational issues pursuant to section 301 jursidiction.25 ° Moreover, a
bifurcation of the action between the NLRB and federal courts is
inimical to the purposes of the Wagner Act. 25 ' Therefore, since the
jurisdiction of the NLRB is primary, primary jurisdiction is no bar
25 2
to section 301 jurisdiction of representational issues.
CONCLUSION

In enacting the Taft-Hartley Act, Congress allocated power to the
courts and the NLRB. The intent of Congress was that the NLRB
240. See 29 U.S.C. §159(b).
241. See NLRB v. George E. Light Boat Storage, Inc., 373 F.2d 762, 768 (5th Cir. 1967).
242. See supra notes 230-32 and accompanying text.
243. See Sovern, supra notes 226, at 556-67.
244. Typically, elections to determine bargaining unit representatives require 286 days; onefourth require more than one year. W. GOULD, A PR1mR ON AMERicAN LABOR LAW 126-27

(1982).
245. See Boire, 479 F.2d at 788.
246. In unfair labor practice cases, for example, between 317 and 350 days elapse between
the petition filed with the court of appeals for enforcement and a court decision. W. GOULD,
supra note 244 at 126-27.
247. See R. Gorman, supra note 225, at 67.
248. Sovern, supra note 226, at 566-67.
249. See supra notes 228-32 and accompanying text.
250. See supra notes 225-35 and accompanying text.
251. See supra notes 242-47 and accompanying text.
252. See supra notes 219-51 and accompanying text.
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have jurisdiction of disputes regarding unfair labor practices and
representational issues, while the court was to enforce labor contracts.
Situations arose in which the jurisdiction of the courts conflicted with
those areas delegated to the NLRB. The allocation of jurisdiction over
representational issues has been troublesome. Particularly, arbitrators
have been allowed to make bargaining unit determinations while the
courts have not been allowed to do so.
The courts addressing the different treatment of section 301 jurisdiction and arbitration have not agreed on the nature of the jurisdiction
of the NLRB over representational issues. The jurisdiction of the
NLRB, however, is most appropriately described as primary. Through
the application of the doctrine of primary jurisdiction to representational issues, section 301 court jurisdiction over these issues serves
the purposes of the doctrine, uniformity and expertise, as well as the
objective of the Wagner Act, industrial peace. Therefore, when acting
pursuant to section 301 jursidiction, federal courts should be able to
determine representational issues.
Lon D. Hamburger
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